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Paying For Defense Of A Consent Decree:
Intervenors, Attorneys' Fees, and
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Thomas
Parties seeking to shift litigation costs to their opponents face

significant obstacles, most notably the so-called American Rule.
The Rule requires each litigant to pay its own attorneys' fees unless there is express statutory authorization to the contrary. In
1975, the United States Supreme Court placed its imprimatur on
the Rule,1 and today, at least partially as a response, more than
2
150 federal fee-shifting statutes are in effect.
The fee-shifting question usually arises in situations where
there are just the two original sets of litigants. In many instances,
however, courts face the more difficult task of apportioning the fee
burden among the original parties and any intervenors. The court
must decide who among them is deserving of a fee award and who
should have to pay it. The presence of consent decrees or settlements poses an even more difficult question: what role should the
fact that the original litigants have resolved their dispute play in
the fee eligibility determination?
This comment examines the propriety of assessing attorneys'
fees against intervenors who unsuccessfully attack a consent decree. Courts often penalize intervenors who fail in their attempts
to overturn or modify settlement by requiring them to pay attorneys' fees, or by denying their requests for fees.3 The District of
Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). In Alyeska Pipeline,
environmentalists sought attorneys' fees for their successful opposition to a pipeline permit.
Subsequent congressional action allowing such permits to be issued mooted the underlying
controversy. Despite the absence of a statute authorizing fees, the court of appeals awarded
fees to the environmentalists on the ground that as the prevailing parties, they had acted as
private attorneys general, vindicating important public rights. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the exception to the American Rule against fee-shifting created by the appellate court was too far-reaching. The Court found that it was the duty of the legislature, not
the judiciary, to shift the costs of litigation.
2 Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 684 (1983). For a partial list of the statutes,
see Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 43-51 (1985) (appendix to dissent of Brennan, J.).
3 See, for example, Vulcan Soc. of Westchester Cty. v. Fire Dept., 533 F. Supp. 1054
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (under civil rights statutes, a portion of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees assessed
against intervenors); United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp., 591 F. Supp. 966
(W.D.N.Y. 1984) (under environmental statutes, no attorneys' fees for intervenors); Friends
of the Earth v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 546 F. Supp. 1357 (D.D.C. 1982) (same).
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Columbia Circuit, until recently, has followed this approach, both
in and out of the settlement context.4 The Circuit's recent decision
in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Thomas ("NRDC")5
however, represents a significant departure;' both the court of appeals and the district court denied the settlement defenders' request for fees under the fee-shifting provision of the Clean Water
Act 7 against intervenors wholly unsuccessful in their attempts to
impart substantive changes in the decree or to overturn it
altogether.
NRDC is a paradigm case for assessing fees against intervenors. The litigation began in 1973 when several environmental
groups filed the first of four related suits against the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). The environmentalists challenged
the government's regulation of toxic discharges under Section
307(a) of the Clean Water Act,8 which was added by the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act ("FWPCA") Amendments of 1972,
and brought suit pursuant to the citizen suit provision of those
amendments."
Soon afterward, the parties began settlement negotiations. In
early 1976, the parties settled and the district court entered a consent decree covering all four suits. 10 The decree "proved to be of
great significance in the administration of FWPCA."" Because
they wanted to help oversee implementation of the decree, several
rubber and chemical companies moved to intervene. The district
court denied their motion but the court of appeals reversed and
allowed the corporations to intervene pursuant to Rule 24(a) of the
See Donnell v. United States, 682 F.2d 240, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. den., 459 U.S.
1204 (1983) (no attorneys' fees awarded to intervenor who contributed "nothing of substance"); Thompson v. Sawyer, 586 F. Supp. 635, 638-39 (D.D.C. 1984) (fees assessed against
would-be intervenor because of three failed attempts to intervene); Friends of the Earth,
546 F. Supp. at 1362. See also Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (recognizing judicial right to assess fees against intervenors); Sierra Club v. EPA, 769 F.2d 796,
811 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (refusal to charge intervenors with fees not meant to preclude fees
against intervenors in all circumstances).
5 801 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
See text at notes 99-116.
Section 505(d) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1982). The section provides that the court, "in issuing any final order in any action brought pursuant to the section, may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to
any party, whenever the court determines such award is appropriate."
33 U.S.C. § 1317(a) (1982).
Section 505 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982).
10 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120 (D.D.C.
1976).
" Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) v. EPA, 595 F. Supp. 65, 68 (D.D.C.
1984) (district court opinion preceding NRDC).
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.12
In 1978, the original parties-the environmentalists and the
EPA-agreed to extend some of the deadlines contained in the settlement. The industry intervenors simultaneously moved to vacate
the decree. They claimed that the 1977 amendments to the Clean
Water Act rendered the decree moot, and that the proposed modification dispensed with public notice and comment procedures and
therefore violated their due process rights. The district court
granted the parties' joint motion to modify and denied the intervenors' motion to vacate.13 The intervenors failed in their appeal
on the mootness and due process issues, but the court of appeals
sua sponte raised the question of whether the settlement imper14
missibly infringed on the discretion of the EPA administrator.
On remand, the intervenors sought to vacate the decree based on
the discretion issue raised by the appellate court.15 Again, the intervenors failed in their efforts at both the district and appellate
court levels.16
Based on these unsuccessful post-settlement efforts, in 1982
the environmentalists moved for attorneys' fees against the intervenors under Section 505(d) of the Clean Water Act. 17 The district
court emphasized that
[i]t would be an anomalous result to find that NRDC
could not be compensated for its efforts to ensure that
this agreement was enforced. This court will not subscribe to such a result ....

The more difficult question is

whether attorneys' fees should be awarded against intervenors for NRDC's efforts to resist intervenors' motions
to modify and vacate the settlement agreement.18
In fact, both the district court and the court of appeals resolved this "difficult question" quite easily. The lower court re12 Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(granting intervention as of right). Four other industry groups that had intervened in one of
the suits joined in the settlement. See NRDC, 801 F.2d at 459.
" Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) v. Costle, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1833 (D.D.C. 1979).
'4 Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
,5 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Gorsuch, 16 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2084
(D.D.C. 1982).
," Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
17 NRDC v. EPA, 595 F. Supp. 65. The environmentalists' request that the EPA pay
their fees for work done in opposition to the agency is not at issue here. Id. at 69.
18 Id. (emphasis added).
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fused to assess fees against the intervenors 9 and the court of appeals, in an opinion by Judge (now Justice) Scalia, affirmed. 2 Both
courts concluded that the intervenors' activity in the unsuccessful
eight-year battle constituted a reasonable attempt to further the
goals of the Clean Water Act. In addition, both courts found that
the EPA, which joined the environmentalists in defending the settlement, should not be liable for the costs incurred by the intervenors' efforts. The court of appeals characterized the question
before it as whether the Act permits fee awards against intervenors
who are private rather than public entities. 21 The opinion suggests
that the intervenors' status as private parties persuaded the court
that such awards are not "appropriate," for such parties deserve
"special care" 22 in the fee award determination.
By refusing to hold the intervenors liable, the court of appeals
in fact created the "anomalous result" the lower court hoped to
prevent: the NRDC, which both courts acknowledged deserved
compensation for successfully defending the decree, 23 could not recover fees from any other litigant. Such a result is inconsistent
with the policies underlying the Clean Water Act in particular and
statutorily created fee shifting in general.
This comment argues (1) that NDRC was wrongly decided,
and (2) that it is always "appropriate" within the meaning of Section 505(d) of the Clean Water Act and other fee-shifting provisions using that language to award fees to settlement defenders
who repel completely unsuccessful attacks by post-settlement intervenors, regardless of the latter's status as private or public
parties.
Part I of the comment examines the courts' general approach
to fee shifting under the Clean Water Act and analogous statutes,
and discusses the treatment of intervenors under these provisions.
Part II evaluates the NRDC decision against this backdrop, and
proposes a bright-line rule for handling the problem of post-decree
intervention and attorneys' fees that, contrary to NRDC's approach, is both responsive to the legal system's desire for settlement and consonant with existing law.

" Id. at 70.

20 NRDC, 801 F.2d at 462.
21 Id. at 461.
22 Id. at 462, quoting Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 692 n.12.
2 NRDC, 801 F.2d at 460-461. See also NRDC v. EPA, 595 F. Supp. at 69.
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I.

A.

FEE-SHIFTING STANDARDS

The General Rule

Fee-shifting provisions fall into one of two general categories:
the statutes provide either that courts award fees to the "prevailing party, '24 or to any party when the court determines that it is
"appropriate" to do so. 25 The fee-shifting provision at issue in

NRDC falls into the latter category, and is found in Section 505,
the citizen suit section of the Clean Water Act 2" which Congress
added through the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 as part of a national campaign to clean up the nation's water supply. 27 The provision, modeled after Section 304 of
the Clean Air Act,28 provides that the court,

in issuing any final order in any action brought pursuant
to this section, may award costs of litigation (including
reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any
party, whenever the court determines such award is
appropriate.29

Congress sought to provide potential litigants with an economic incentive: 30 "courts should award costs of litigation" to citizens "per2, See, for example, the Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.

§

1988 (1982): "[Tjhe court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."
25 See, for example, Section 505(d) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1982):
"[The court] may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness
fees) to any party, whenever the court determines such award is appropriate." Ruckelshaus,
463 U.S. at 682-83 n.1, lists 16 federal statutes with language virtually identical to that of
Section 505(d).
26 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1982).
27 Sen. Rep. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 3668, 3674-77.
28 2 Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, at
1497 (1973) ("1972 Legislative History"). Section 304 of the Clean Air Act provides in relevant part that the court "may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and
expert witness fees) to any party, wherever the court determines such award is appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1982) (emphasis added). For Clean Air Act history see H.R. Rep.
91-1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5356; and
H.R. Rep. 95-294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 1077.
29 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (emphasis added).
20 For discussion of the purposes underlying fee shifting, see generally Thomas D.
Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 Duke L.J.
651; Robert V. Percival & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of Attorney Fee Shifting in Public
Interest Litigation, 47 Law & Contemp. Probs. 233 (Winter 1984). For a discussion of the
tension in fee shifting between the twin policy goals of enforcement incentives and of punitive measures against frivolous suits, see Frances Kahn Zemans, Fee Shifting and the Implementation of Public Policy, 47 Law & Contemp. Probs. 187 (Winter 1984).
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forming a public service" by bringing suit.3 However, fearing possible abuse of the fee award mechanism,3 2Congress also sought to
discourage frivolous or harassing actions.
Section 505(d) proved to be uncontroversial and passed with
ease, but the section has troubled both courts and commentators
because of what they see as an inherent vagueness and ambiguity
in the chosen standard.3 3 Nowhere is the word "appropriate" defined in the statute. Also, neither the section nor its legislative history makes reference to intervenors.3 4 Most importantly, the statute fails to describe specifically who should receive fees and who
should pay them.3 5 The Senate committee report provides some
guidance, however, by distinguishing between winning and losing
plaintiffs: a winning plaintiff may recover fees from its opponent
while a losing plaintiff is liable for fees to its opponent if the suit
''ss
was "frivolous or harassing.
Few courts to date have attempted a careful analysis of Section 505(d)'s "appropriate" language.3 7 Much of the judicial discus",Sen. Rep. No. 92-414, 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 3747 (cited in note
27). See also the statement of Senator Cooper in Senate debate on S. 2770, 1972 Legislative
History at 1306 (cited in note 28) ("the regulation of environmental quality is of fundamental concern to the public" and "[i]t
is appropriate, therefore, that an opportunity be provided for citizen involvement").
32 Sen. Rep. 92-414, 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 3747 (cited in note 27).
31 See, for example, Bruce Fein, Citizen Suit Attorney Fee Shifting Awards: A Critical
Examination of Government-"Subsidized" Litigation, 47 Law & Contemp. Probs. 211, 22829 (Winter 1984) (lack of articulated standard forces courts into legislative role).
" The reports for Section 505(d)'s companion provisions under the Clean Air Act do
not make reference to intervenors either. However, the legislative history for the Civil
Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, notes that while "[i]n the large
majority of cases the party or parties seeking to enforce such rights will be the plaintiffs
and/or plaintiff intervenors . . . [,] the parties seeking to enforce such rights may be the
defendants and/or defendant-intervenors." Sen. Rep. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5908, 5912. See generally 1972 Legislative History (cited in note 28).
11 Such an omission in the statute is a critical but common flaw not confined to legislative actions. Both in and out of the environmental context courts also often fail to provide
explicit directions on remand as to which party or parties should bear the fee burden. See,
for example, Dawson v. Pastrick, 600 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1979) (under the Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the appellate court remanded to the district
court for determination of the amount of the fee award but failed to state against whom it
should be assessed; language of decision, however, indicates strong disapproval of intervenors' anti-settlement efforts, suggesting intervenors should bear fee burden).
36 Sen. Rep. No. 92-414, 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 3747 (cited in note
27).
37 One court indirectly suggested that "appropriate" means whatever is "fair."
Roosevelt Campobello Intern. Park v. EPA, 711 F.2d 431, 434 (1st Cir. 1983). Another found
that an award is "appropriate" to the extent it covers costs incurred in furthering the Section 505 claim. Citizens Coordinating Committee v. WMATA, 765 F.2d 1169, 1174 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
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sion, however, centers on the virtually identical fee-shifting provisions in the Clean Air Act and on the civil rights fee shifting
statutes. Accordingly, analogy to these statutes is helpful.38 The
Clean Air Act provides for fee shifting in two contexts: in citizen
suits under Section 304(d) and in judicial review proceedings
under Section 307(f).3 9 As with Section 505 of the Clean Water
Act, Congress failed to define in the Clean Air Act what it meant
by "appropriate." The absence of any precise legislative definition
has proved troubling to some judges,40 but in general courts readily
have assumed the task of fashioning a definition.
The leading case attempting to define the standard is Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club,41 and it has become the centerpiece of what
has in practice, at least in the environmental and civil rights contexts, become a merger of the "appropriate" and "prevailing
party" standards into a single, two-pronged test. To recover fees
under the "appropriate" standard, (1) a party must have achieved
some success on the merits, and (2) its actions must have contributed to statutory goals.4 2 Ruckelshaus gave birth to the first prong,
while its dissent and another Clean Air Act case, Metropolitan
Washington Coalitionfor Clean Air v. Districtof Columbia,3 gave
birth to the second.
18 Analogy to these provisions may even be required. The Supreme Court has held that
its interpretation of the "appropriate" language in Section 307(f) of the Clean Air Act (requiring some success on the merits) controls interpretation of other identical provisions,
including Section 505(d). Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 682 n.1.
19 Section 304(d) provides that "[t]he court, in issuing any final order in any action
brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, may award costs of litigation (including
reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party, wherever the court determines
such an award is appropriate."42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1982) (emphasis added). Section 307(f)
provides that "[i]n any judicial proceeding under this section, the court may award costs of
litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) whenever it determines
that such award is appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f) (1982) (emphasis added). Congress
added Section 304 in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970. H.R. Rep. No. 91-1146, 1970
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 5388 (cited in note 28). It added Section 307(f) in the
1977 amendments. H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 1106
(cited in note 28).
40 See, for example, Alabama Power v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (dissent
of Wilkey, J.) (it is "inconsistent with the judicial role" to accept "Congress' implicit invitation to supply" a definition of "appropriate"). See also Fein, 47 Law and Contemp. Probs. at
224 (cited in note 33) (lack of articulated legislative standards transfers policy making from
Congress to courts). Of course, there is the alternative view that such a judicial practice is
not truly "legislative" but rather reflects the proper function of a court in statutory
interpretation.
463 U.S. 680, 682 (1983) ("appropriate" means the would-be fee recipient must have
achieved some substantive success on the merits). See text at notes 57-64.
42 Sierra Club v. EPA, 769 F.2d 796 (1985).
43 639 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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In Ruckelshaus, the Supreme Court essentially equated "appropriate" with "prevailing party" by holding that both standards
require minimum levels of success on the merits for a litigant to
recover fees." Likewise, other judicial discussions have used the
terms interchangeably or in such a manner as to suggest also that,
as a practical matter, there is no cognizable difference between the
two. In some Section 1988 fee award eligibility determinations, for
example, courts using the "prevailing party" standard have questioned whether fee awards against parties under Section 1988 are
"appropriate, 4 5 or whether "appropriate special circumstances"
exist that would support denial of an award of attorneys' fees.
And, in an action under the Voting Rights Act fee-shifting provision, 47 also using the "prevailing party" standard, a court of appeals remanded the case to the district court with the instruction
that the lower court "resolve this controversy and determine if fees
48
are appropriate."
Despite this treatment, the NRDC court summarily dismissed
any analogy to Section 1988 and the "prevailing party" standard
because of a mere textual difference. 49 However, the court ignored
the history that the "appropriate" and "prevailing party" standards share.
Section 505 of the Clean Water Act, which uses the "appropriate" standard, and the Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act of
1976 (Section 1988) ,50 which uses the "prevailing party" standard,
provide the most striking example of the standards' shared background. Section 1988 is the legislative response to the Supreme
Court's mandate in Alyeska Pipeline;the section's purpose was to
"remedy [the] anomalous gaps in our civil rights laws" created by
that decision. 5 The section is an "essential remedy if private citi" Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 686.
45 See, for example, Decker v. United States Dept. of Labor, 564 F. Supp. 1273, 1280
(E.D. Wis. 1983). The Decker court speaks in such terms at three points during the course
of the opinion. See also Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. City of Akron, 604 F.
Supp. 1268, 1273 n.5 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (rejecting case law offered by intervenors in support
-of their position against fee assessment, finding that none of the cases "suggest[s] that an
award of attorneys' fees against intervenor-defendants would never be appropriate") (emphasis added).
46 Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 604 F. Supp. at 1273.
47 42 U.S.C. § 1973(1) (1982).
48 Donnell, 682 F.2d at 249 (emphasis added).
49 NRDC, 801 F.2d at 461 n.3.
50 42 U.S.C.-§ 1988 (1982).
5,Sen. Rep. No. 94-1011, 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 5909 (cited in note
34). Alyeska Pipeline forbade fee shifting in the absence of express statutory authorization.
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zens are to have a meaningful opportunity to vindicate... important Congressional policies...." 52 Just four years earlier Congress
had expressed the same sentiments with regard to Section 505:
"public participation ... is essential to the accomplishment of the
53
objectives we seek ....
Not only do both provisions thus serve to promote private enforcement of statutory goals, but their approaches for evaluating
fee award claims are the same as well. The language in the Section
505(d) Senate committee report foreshadows the dual standard
courts would later incorporate into the Section 1988 jurisprudence:
under Section 505(d) a court "should award" fees to a plaintiff
bringing a legitimate suit 54 while a defendant may recover fees only
when a plaintiff's suit is "frivolous or harassing. '55 Moreover, the
Senate committee report on Section 1988, in explaining the rationale behind the dual standard, finds that other statutes providing
for attorneys' fees have followed "similar standards," and expressly
lists the Clean Water and Clean Air acts. 6
Thus, the "appropriate" standard, as courts have applied it,
has two components: the would-be fee recipient must (1) have
achieved some success on the merits, and (2) have acted in a manner that furthers statutory goals.5 7 The former found approval in
Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 269.
52

Sen. Rep. No. 94-1011, 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 5910 (cited in note

"

Sen. Rep. No. 92-414, 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 3679 (cited in note

34).
27).
"
Id. at 3747. Compare Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)
(per curiam) (in civil rights fee-shifting context, a court should "ordinarily" award fees "unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust"). In practice, under § 1988
courts have rejected most, if not all, claims of "special circumstances" that would preclude
an award of attorneys' fees to a prevailing party. See generally E. Richard Larson, Federal
Court Awards of Attorney's Fees 44-51 (1981).
" Sen. Rep. No. 92-414, 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 3747 (cited in note
27). Compare Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978) (in civil rights
fee-shifting context, a prevailing defendant may recover fees if suit was "frivolous, unreasonable, or ... the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so").
"I Sen. Rep. No. 94-1011, 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 5912 (cited in 34).
The committee wrote that the "bill thus deters frivolous suits by authorizing an award of
attorneys' fees against a party shown to have litigated in 'bad faith'.... Similar standards
have been followed ... in other statutes providing for attorneys' fees. E.g., the Water Pollution Control Act ... and the Clean Air Act." Id.
" See, for example, Hooker Chemicals, 592 F. Supp. at 70; and Stoddard v. Western
Carolina Regional Sewer Auth., 784 F.2d 1200, 1209 (4th Cir. 1986), combining the constructions of Section 307(f) of the Clean Air Act in Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. 680 (some success on
the merits) and Metropolitan Washington, 639 F.2d 802 (action of a type Congress meant to
encourage). The District of Columbia Circuit combined the two standards in Sierra Club,
769 F.2d 796. The development of this standard is examined in detail in the text at notes
41-70.
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the Supreme Court's decision in Ruckelshaus.5 8 Ruckelshaus
marks the last time the Supreme Court interpreted the "appropriate" standard, yet the case remains far from the final word on the
subject."9
In Ruckelshaus, a divided Supreme Court held that the "appropriate" language requires that the would-be fee recipient
achieve "some degree of [substantive] success on the merits"
before a court may authorize an award.6 0 The case involved a request for attorneys' fees by environmentalists who unsuccessfully
contended that EPA emission standards violated the Clean Air
Act. Although the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit rejected the environmentalists' claims,61 it nevertheless
granted their request for fees under Section 307(f) for their "contributions to the goals of the Clean Air Act. ' 62 The Supreme Court

reversed in a strongly worded 5-4 decision, holding that the principles historically underlying fee shifting require that a party prevail
to some degree before it may receive fees. The majority relied on
"intuitive notions of fairness" embodied in the American Rule
against fee shifting 63 and the supposed costliness of what it
64
deemed an otherwise inherently difficult determination.
A vigorous dissent, however, emphasized that Congress's intentional choice of the "appropriate" language instead of the "prevailing party" language of other fee-shifting statutes6 5 was meant
to give the courts "authority to award fees and costs to a broader
category of parties." 6 According to the dissent, the purpose of an
58463 U.S. 680.
" The sharply divided opinion has generated some equally vehement commentary. See,
for example, Amy Semmel, Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club: A Misinterpretation of the Clean
Air Act's Attorneys' Fees Provision, 12 Ecology L.Q. 399 (1985) (criticizing Court for erroneously attributing to Congress a bias against fee shifting and arguing that such statutes are
entitled to an interpretation designed to further legislative intent to permit fee awards);
Comment, Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club: Attorneys' Fees Awards to Nonprevailing Litigants
are not "Appropriate" under the Clean Air Act, 9 J. Corp. L. 965 (1984) (arguing that Court
was correct and that ambiguity of "appropriate" standard precludes its consistent
application).
60 Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 694.
61 Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
62 Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
6 Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 686.
" Id. at 694 The majority feared that courts generally would be unable to fill in the
blanks provided by an allegedly ambiguous standard, hinting strongly that the "appropriate" standard is really no standard at all.
65 See, for example, the Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 (court "may allow the prevailing party.., a reasonable attorney's fee").
6 Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 694 (dissent of Stevens, J.).
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award of costs and fees is "to allocate the costs of litigation-equitably, to encourage the achievement of statutory goals."6' 7
The Ruckleshaus dissent's conception of the purpose of feeshifting first found judicial sanction two years earlier in the District of Columbia Circuit's decision in Metropolitan Washington
Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia. 8 It has since become the second prong of the two-pronged test. In Metropolitan
Washington, a case which also involved Section 307(f) of the Clean
Air Act, the court of appeals held that whether fees were "appropriate" did not hinge on a suit's outcome but rather on whether
the suit at its initiation was "of the type that Congress intended to
encourage" when it enacted the provision.69 Post-Ruckelshaus decisions combine the Metropolitan Washington and Ruckelshaus
constructions into a dual-faceted test: to recover fees under the
"appropriate" standard the party must have achieved some success
on the merits and its actions must have contributed to statutory
goals.7 0
B.

Fee Awards and Intervenors

71
The entry of additional parties into a lawsuit by intervention
does not alter the two-pronged test to determine which party

6 Id. at 706 (dissent of Stevens, J.) (emphasis added), quoting Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1338 (1st Cir. 1973).
68 639 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Id. at 804.
70 Sierra Club, 769 F.2d at 799-800; Stoddard, 784 F.2d at 1209. See also Northern
Plains Resource Council v. EPA, 734 F.2d 408, 408-09 (9th Cir. 1984) ("NPRC"). In NPRC,
on remand from the Supreme Court, the court of appeals denied plaintiff's request for fees,
but reemphasized the reasoning of Metropolitan Washington that it earlier had found so
persuasive: "Congress seemed inclined to facilitate challenges of EPA decisions to insure
that the EPA fulfilled its designatedfunction of preservind air quality." (emphasis added).
The appellate court was reluctant to deny fees, noting that "NPRC brought this suit to
promote the quality of air resources" and that the "suit presented issues important to the
construction of the Clean Air Act." Id. at 409 (emphasis added).
7' See Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 24. See generally 3B Moore's Federal Practice 24 (1985)
("Moore"); Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, 7C Federal Practice
& Procedure (1986) ("Wright"). Rule 24(a) provides in relevant part that
anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action ... when the applicant claims
an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's
interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
Rule 24(b) provides in relevant part that
anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action ... when an applicant's claim
or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common ....In
exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
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should recover attorneys' fees. This is consistent with the historically subordinate status of intervenors.7 2 An intervenor is entitled
to receive fees under the "appropriate" standard, if, like any other
litigant, it enjoys some success on the merits of its claims while
furthering statutory goals.7 3
At least in the environmental and civil rights contexts, courts
have used the same two-pronged test to determine the fee liability
of intervenors as well. In Sierra Club v. EPA,7 4 the District of Columbia Circuit stated expressly what had been implicit in previous
fee award decisions: to escape fee liability an intervenor must enjoy some substantive success on the merits of its claims while acting in a manner that furthers statutory goals. 5
In Sierra Club, environmentalists successfully challenged various EPA regulations implementing the 1977 Clean Air Act amendments. They also successfully opposed the attempts of industry intervenors both to modify the court of appeals' order and to
persuade the Supreme Court to hear the case.16 The environmentalists then sought fees for their efforts, but the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit refused, finding that the industry intervenors had "reasonably" attempted to advance statutory goals.77 More importantly, however, the court twice expressly
refused to hold that intervenors should always be insulated from
fee liability.7 8
See text at notes 81-84.
Many courts have denied intervenors' requests for fees under both the Clean Air Act
and the civil rights fee-shifting provisions. The underlying rationale typically suggests that
the intervenors' participation was frivolous or obstructionist. Sometimes an even lower
threshold is sufficient. For example, in Alabama Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.
1982), a Clean Air Act case, intervenor environmentalists sought attorneys' fees under Section 307(f) for, inter alia, work done in concert with the EPA regarding the agency's air
quality regulations. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied their
request because the intervenors' participation did not add "in any essential way" to the
issues involved. Id. at 4.
In those few instances in which intervenors have recovered fees, their participation has
proved helpful on substantive issues. See, for example, Baker v. City of Detroit, 504 F.
Supp. 841 (E.D. Mich. 1980), vacated and remanded on other grounds as Bratton v. City of
Detroit, 712 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1983) (in civil rights suit involving fee request under Section
1988, intervenors' actions contributed to result by demonstrating existence of past discrimination and subsequent need for affirmative action plan).
74 769 F.2d 796 (1985).
71 Id. at 810.
76 Id. at 799, 810.
7 Id. at 811.
78 Id. at 810-11. Compare Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 604 F. Supp. 1268.
There, shortly after plaintiff abortion clinics filed their complaint challenging the validity of
a city abortion ordinance, two individuals petitioned the court to intervene as representatives of a class of parents whose children might be affected by such an ordinance. The court
72

71
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In the other principal case in which intervenors have escaped
fee liability, the court also applied the two-pronged interpretation
of the "appropriate" standard to determine whether the intervenors should have borne the fee burden. In Delaware Valley Citi7 9
zens' Council v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
the Third Circuit declined to assess fees against the intervenors. Faced with the
unique situation in which the defendant, the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, and the intervenors, several Pennsylvania legislators, were, as a practical matter, inseparable branches of state government, the court affirmed an award of fees to environmentalists
who had successfully defended a 1978 consent decree. The court
found, however, that the defendant Commonwealth, and not the
intervenors, should pay the environmentalists' attorneys' fees.
While alluding to the two-pronged test, the court nevertheless refused to "parse out the roles and responsibilities of various
branches of the state government."' 0
The courts' treatment of intervenors in the fee-shifting context as discussed above has deep historical roots. Traditionally, the
intervenor lived a judicial life subordinate to that of the original
litigants under old Equity Rule 37.81 The subordination doctrine
officially fell from grace with the advent of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and today an intervenor theoretically is treated as
if he were an original party.82 However, the intervention device
does not confer upon the newcomer unrestricted control over the
existing litigation. An intervenor cannot, for example, change the
issues framed by the original parties. 83 Also, courts can control the
participation of an intervenor by imposing conditions upon intervention. Such conditions more often attach to permissive intervention than to intervention as of right, although they sometimes at84
tach to the latter as well.
granted their motion but restricted their participation to a narrowly defined set of issues.
Nevertheless, the pair "vigorously" litigated their claims, consequently disrupting the flow
of the litigation and forcing the court to "stop their inquiry into areas beyond the permitted
scope of intervention." Id. at 1272. Ultimately, the intervenors neither prevailed on the merits to any substantial degree nor contributed to statutory goals, thus prompting the court to
charge them with fees and award them to the plaintiffs. Id. at 1272-74.
79 762 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1985), aff'd in relevant part, 106 S. Ct. 3088 (1986).
10 Id. at 277.

" See Wright, § 1920 at 487 (cited in note 71).

82 Id. at 488.

Id. at 489.
, Id. at 503. Courts can limit the participation of an intervenor as of right to overseeing implementation of a consent decree, as in NRDC v. Costle, 561 F.2d at 911 n.36 (granting post-settlement intervention as of right to rubber and chemical companies in litigation
that led to the attorneys' fee dispute at issue in NRDC). At least one treatise praises the
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It is in the fee-shifting context where this de facto subordination becomes most evident. Courts often reject an intervenor's
claims that its status as an intervenor is a "special circumstance"
insulating it from fee liability. 5 Also, if an intervenor's participation contributes little or nothing substantive to the development of
the issues, courts often willingly assess fees against the intervenor.8e As the District of Columbia Circuit has noted, Congress
did not intend to make a fee award "as nearly automatic" for intervenors as for other litigants, 7 and also did not intend for intervenors to escape fee liability in all circumstances. 8
C. Fee Awards, Intervenors and Settlement
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, courts hold intervenors to the same two-pronged standard as the original litigants
in determining when fee awards are "appropriate." The presence
of settlement or a consent decree, however, should and in fact does
tip the balance against the intervenors, particularly when the question is whether the court should assess fees against them.
Courts justify this treatment by recognizing the need to preserve the integrity of compromise in the face of intervenor attack.89
The law strongly favors settlement, particularly in light of the 'need
to allocate "scarce federal judicial resources."90 As in many other
good sense of such limitations, urging that intervenors be kept within manageable bounds.
3B Moore at 24-175 (cited in note 71).
15 The view is most dominant in the civil rights context. See, for example, Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, 604 F. Supp. 1268; Decker, 564 F. Supp. 1273.
86 See, for example, May v. Cooperman, 578 F. Supp. 1308, 1317 (D.N.J. 1984) (under
Section 1988, fees assessed against intervenors; section contemplates assessment without regard to type of contribution) (dictum); Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 604 F. Supp.
at 1274 (fees assessed against intervenors; intervenors' contribution to issues held not a
"special circumstance" under Section 1988).
11 Donnell, 682 F.2d at 246.
88 Sierra Club, 769 F.2d at 810-11.
89 See, for example, Kirkland v. N. Y. State Dep't of Correctional Services, 711 F.2d
1117 (2d Cir. 1983) (in Title VII class action by correction officers, court limited the right of
nonminority intervenors to challenge reasonableness or validity of settlement). Consider also
the view that intervention for the purpose of "impeaching a decree already made" is prohibited. 3B Moore at 24-179 (cited in note 71), quoting U.S. v. California Canneries, 279 U.S.
553, 556 (1929) (opinion of Brandeis, J.).
"I Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d
1006, 1014 n.10 (7th Cir. 1980), citing Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1331 (5th Cir. 1977).
The Metropolitan Housing court found the public policy favoring settlement to be important in areas where voluntary compliance by parties over time will contribute significantly
toward ultimate achievement of statutory goals. For a critique of settlement as a favored
means of dispute resolution, see generally Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J.
1073 (1984). In this regard see also Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Pan-
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areas of the law, most environmental litigation ends in settlement.e" Courts accord great deference to settlement upon review,92
and, in the fee-shifting context, dispute resolution by settlement is
sufficient to confer upon a fee seeker "prevailing party" status, 3 a
key element enabling the party to recover fees. In the face of attack by intervenors, both courts and commentators recognize an
even greater need for deference.9 4 Accordingly, when the original
litigants have settled, courts readily charge intervenors with fees.9 5
Most of the cases involve fee shifting under the civil rights
statutes. In fact, the only case other than NRDC to address the
intervenor-settlement fee problem under Section 505(d) of the
Clean Water Act 96 involved the question of intervenor fee entitlement rather than intervenor fee liability. In United States v.
Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp.,97 the district court refused to
grant fees to citizens groups who had intervened after settlement
because it found that the settlement reflected no contribution by

acea or Anathema? 99 Harv. L. Rev. 668, 676-82 (1986) (arguing that public law disputes
such as those involving environmental issues should be resolved by adjudication rather than
private settlement so as to prevent incursion of private values into public law domain).
I" Robert V. Percival, The Bounds of Consent: Consent Decrees, Settlements and Federal Environmental Policymaking, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 327, 328.
92 See, for example, Airline Stewards, Etc. v. American Airlines, 573 F.2d 960 (7th Cir.
1978).
93 Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129-30 (1980) (litigant challenging denial of federal
aid in civil rights action considered to have "prevailed" for purposes of award of attorneys'
fees despite fact that she settled her claim).
9' See 3B Moore at 24-180 (cited in note 71) (pre-intervention decree should be set
aside only if it clearly would deprive intervenor of substantial rights). See also Dawson v.
Pastrick, 600 F.2d 70, 76 (7th Cir. 1979) (warning that allowing post-settlement changes to
upset the decree would encourage settling litigants to back out of the agreement; "in the
absence of unusual hardship to the objecting party, we decline to permit subsequent events
to defeat otherwise reasonable settlements").
91 See, for example, Reeves v. Harrell, 791 F.2d 1481, 1485 (11th Cir. 1986) (in Section
1988 action, untimely intervention held frivolous); Vulcan Soc. of Westchester Cty., 533 F.
Supp. at 1062 (in Section 1988 action, intervenors' "persistent activity inflicted" expenses).
But see Kirkland v. N. Y. State Dep't of Correctional Services, 524 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (no fees assessed against intervenors because of their good faith efforts to assert their
own rights). Kirkland appears to be in the minority, although it was expressly followed in
Paradise v. Prescott, 626 F. Supp. 117, 118 (M.D. Ala. 1985) (intervenors were "functionally
plaintiffs" and therefore should not have been liable for fees unless their claims were "without foundation," which they were not). Compare Comment, Protecting Defendant-Intervenors from Attorneys' Fee Liability in Civil Rights Cases, 23 Harv. J. on Legis. 579 (1986)
(urging limited attorneys' fee liability for private defendant-intervenors in civil rights litigation); and Brian Zenkichi Tamanaha, The Cost of Preserving Rights: Attorneys' Fee Awards
and Intervenors in Civil Rights Litigation, 19 Harv. C.R.-C.L. Rev. 109 (1984) (urging same
treatment in fee eligibility determinations for both pro-plaintiff and pro-defendant
intervenors).
9 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1982).
9 591 F. Supp. 966 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).
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the intervenors and that an award of fees under Section 505 would
be "entirely inappropriate.""s Implicit in the court's reasoning was
the intervenors' lack of success in changing the terms of the settlement and their failure to act in a manner that furthered statutory
goals.
II.

POST-DECREE INTERVENTION:

THE NEED FOR A BRIGHT-LINE RULE

A. The Problematic Rule of NRDC v. Thomas
In NRDC, the critical question facing the court was whether
the intervenors should be liable for fees to the environmentalists. 9
The statutory scheme, providing for fees against losing plaintiffs
whose actions are "frivolous or harassing," 1° envisions an affirmative answer. In NRDC, the industries intervened as parties-defendant. 0 However, as a practical matter, their interests initially were
aligned more closely with those of the environmentalists, the plaintiffs in the underlying litigation: 10 2 their goal was to ensure that
the EPA complied with the Clean Water Act. With regard to the
decree, the intervenors brought with them a realignment of the
parties; the environmentalists-the original plaintiffs-joined the
EPA-the original defendant-in defending the decree against intervenor attack.
The NRDC court found that the intervenors' efforts were reasonable. 03 However, it accepted without question the proposition
that the intervenors' claims had continuing vitality, despite the reality that the intervenors repeatedly lost on every point.10 4 Even if
the court were correct that the intervenors' claims remained reasonable throughout the eight-year battle over the decree, the intervenors' activity was nevertheless harassing. Accordingly, they
should have been liable for fees under the statute as losing
plaintiffs.
The dispositive factor in NRDC should have been the intervenors' absolute failure to make substantive contributions to the
"8

Id. at 971. The court rejected the intervenors' claims that they had been responsible

for "de facto modifications" of the agreement when any modifications that existed had been
made by the principal litigants or did not exist at all.
9 See NRDC v. EPA, 595 F. Supp. at 69.
oo Sen. Rep. No. 92-414, 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 3747 (cited in note
27).
.0. NRDC v. Costle, 561 F.2d at 907.
102NRDC v. EPA, 595 F. Supp. at 70.
103

NRDC, 801 F.2d at 462.

I" See text at notes 10-16.
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decree. Both the district court and the court of appeals documented with striking particularity the intervenors' persistent yet
unsuccessful eight-year battle to vacate or modify the agreement. 105 Moreover, their choice to enter the litigation after the
original parties settled was apparently a strategic attempt to interpose delay, rather than to offer considered suggestions. The intervenors' late entry should not have worked a hardship-the denial
of fees-on the settling litigants.
There is, however, the view that in a less tangible sense the
intervenors made a contribution and thus their efforts were not so
clearly harassing. One might posit that their activity exhausted significant challenges to the decree, thereby insulating it from future
attack by someone else. However, such a view discounts the fact
that this would not necessarily preclude a future potential challenger from at minimum trying to attack the decree, thus triggering actions in defense, regardless of whether estoppel would eventually bar the effort.
The precedent facing the NRDC court also required that the
court have assessed fees against the intervenors. The same factors
that determine when fees should be awarded to a party also apply
in deciding against whom such awards should be made. 0 6 Thus, a
party who achieves no substantive success and fails to act in a
manner furthering statutory goals pays fees to the party that
does. 107 The intervenors in NRDC neither succeeded on the merits
nor furthered statutory goals. At the outset, the intervenors' professed reason for entering the litigation-to help oversee implementation of the decree 0 8-advanced the purposes underlying the
Clean Water Act. Clearly, preservation of a joint EPA-environmentalist agreement is a type of enforcement envisioned by the
legislature. But the picture that subsequently evolved was quite
different: the intervenors' activity resulted in nothing more than
an eight-year delay in implementing a decree that was acknowledged as being valuable. 10 9
The NRDC court's decision to insulate the intervenors from
fee liability is thus out of step with congressional intent and with
the predominant judicial construction of the "appropriate" standard for awarding fees. The effect of the court's holding is to sug105 Id.
,oOSierra Club, 769 F.2d at 810. See text at notes 74-80.
107 Id.
NRDC v. Costle, 561 F.2d at 907.
NRDC v. EPA, 595 F. Supp. at 69.
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gest the following rule: a party may recover attorneys' fees under
the "appropriate" standard if it satisfies the two-pronged test of
(1) prevailing to some degree on the merits while (2) advancing
statutory goals, unless the party against whom the fees are sought
is a private intervenor. The NRDC court began its analysis correctly, but added a troubling element: disallowing fee awards
against private intervenors.
This "private intervenor" limitation is problematic for several
reasons. First, it creates a troublesome asymmetry: a party who
wins is entitled to fees while the party who loses escapes fee liability if it is a private entity. Second, the genesis of this limitation is
the questionable distinction between public and private litigants
the Supreme Court drew in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club.110 The
Court's rationale for differential treatment was two-fold: (1) a private litigant's ability to bear a fee burden may be less than that of
a governmental or other public entity; and (2) private and public
parties have differing responsibilities for fulfilling statutory purposes."' On this basis, the NRDC court found that as private litigants, the intervening corporations deserved "special care""' 2 in
determining whether to assess fees. This distinction, implicitly requiring deferential treatment toward private litigants, is not a justifiable one to make, particularly in the NRDC context.
The first prong of the "special care" rationale ignores the fact
that a public entity is not necessarily better-equipped than a private concern to pay fees, for the former shoulders enormous public
responsibilities and often works within tight fiscal constraints. A
fee award assessed against a public agency, while benefitting the
individual fee recipient, may actually work to the disadvantage of a
broader class of persons than the agency paying the fee. By reducing the agency's monetary resources, the award reduces the
amount of money available for use in the agency's public programs.
On the other hand, a private entity's resources in many instances
may be far more substantial. In NRDC, in particular, the intervenors were multibillion-dollar corporations, including, among others,
Dow Chemical Company, E.I. duPont de Nemours, and Firestone
Tire and Rubber. 113
The second prong is similarly flawed. Many enforcement statutes, the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act among

110

463 U.S. at 692 n.12.

m Id.
112 NRDC, 801 F.2d at 461-62; see also note 22.
11
NRDC v. Costle, 561 F.2d at 907 n.10 and n.1.
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them, expressly provide for suits against both governmental bodies
and private industry.1 14 Both types of entities, regardless of their
character, must adhere to the legislative mandate. Finally, the
NRDC court's rule is also troublesome in that it downplays the
importance both of settlement as a favored means of dispute resolution 15 and of deference to settlement in the face of intervenor
11 6
attack.
B. An Alternative Solution
A better rule for fee determinations in the intervenor-settlement context, and one more in line with the spirit of the "appropriate" standard and the purposes underlying statutorily-created
fee shifting, is the following: it is always "appropriate" under provisions using such language to award fees to successful settlemefit
defenders and against wholly unsuccessful post-settlement intervenors. Stated another way, it is always "appropriate" to assess
or public,
fees againstpost-settlement intervenors, whether private
11 7
who completely fail in challenging a consent decree.
This proposed rule for awarding attorneys' fees is consonant
with the approach developed by courts for making such determinations under the "appropriate" standard. Only those post-settlement intervenors who fail to achieve any substantive success by
contributing to the development of the decree, and who, by definition, have done nothing to further statutory goals, will be liable for
fees. There will, of course, be intermediate cases. The NRDC experience itself suggests that in such situations a court could consider
such factors as the number and importance of substantive changes
to the decree; the length of time the intervenor's post-settlement
activity added to the litigation; and the degree and reasonableness
of any variance between the initial reason for intervention and the
resultant reason for settlement attack. 18
" See Section 505 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) and (2): "any citizen
may commence a civil action on his own behalf (1) against any person (including (i) the
United States and (ii) any other governmental instrumentality or agency... ) who is alleged
to be in violation of... an effluent standard ... or (2) against the Administrator [of the
EPA for] alleged failure ... to perform any [nondiscretionary act or duty]."
115 See Frank Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in Consent Judgments, 1987 U. Chi.
Legal F. 19.
ill See text at notes 89-98.
The proposed standard would not affect the ability to intervene. However, it would
place the risks of doing so on the intervenor by rendering the intervenor liable for the attorneys' fees of settlement defenders if it completely fails in its attack of the consent decree.
18 At least one commentator, suggesting that better legislative drafting is the answer,
has proposed a model statute incorporating some of these factors. Under his proposal, a

502

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[1987:

The suggested rule is appealing in several other respects. First,
it creates important positive incentives which the NRDC rule does
not. It encourages prospective litigants to give more thought to the
timing of their intervention, which in turn ultimately affects the
representative quality of the decree. Because the original parties
have not yet cemented their agreement, and, as a consequence,
may be less resistant to suggestions for change, a pre-settlement
intervenor is more likely to help mold the settlement terms. A decree thus developed is more reflective of a wider range of interests,
and is thereby likely to be even more in tune with the spirit of the
underlying substantive law.
In addition, even if prospective intervenors forego an earlier
entry into the litigation, the proposed solution encourages them to
undertake an even more careful preparation and argument of their
contentions to insure against total failure and its attendant fee liability. Such heightened effort is likely to increase their chances of
success-an acceptance by the original litigants and the court of
some modifications to the decree-again rendering the agreement
representative of a broader range of interests. 119
Finally, the proposed solution enables future litigants to predict when any fee award would be "appropriate;" successful decree
defenders will always receive fees from intervenors wholly unsuccessful in attacking the agreement.
The proposed solution, however, concededly carries with it the
specter of some negative, yet not insurmountable, incentive effects.
Most importantly, such a rule might discourage intervention. As a
practical matter, intervention is of little use if the intervenor cannot act to protect its interests once it gains entry into the litigation. However, the rule affects only those who choose to enter late
in the game and who completely fail to effect substantive modifications or to overturn a decree. In such situations, this disincentive
might actually benefit the judicial system as a whole, since only
those parties who are in a position to add substantively to a preexisting agreement will now chance post-settlement intervention.

court "may award" fees to any party when it finds that the following circumstances are
present: the party has "substantiallyprevailed," and the party "has sought to effectuate the
purposes" of the statute by, inter alia, supplying new and important information, or by
raising a significant interest not otherwise considered. Fein, 47 Law & Contemp. Probs. at
230-31 (emphasis in original) (cited in note 33).
"I In NRDC, four of the eight industry groups involved in the connected suits did participate in the decree negotiations. NRDC, 801 F.2d at 459. See note 12. The opinions are
silent as to why some intervenors participated in settlement negotiations and the others, the
ones seeking to escape fee liability, did not.
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Furthermore, although the rule may snare well-intentioned
but unsuccessful settlement-attacking intervenors, it nevertheless
serves several broader purposes in doing so. First, recognizing the
inherent tension in such fee award situations between the rights of
the original parties and those of subsequent intervenors, the rule
tips the balance to favor the settlement defenders. This accords
with accepted doctrine favoring settlement. 12 0 Second, and more
importantly, the rule is consistent with the purpose underlying fee
shifting-to encourage private enforcement of legislative goals-by
making it more attractive to a potential plaintiff to bring an enforcement suit in the first instance knowing that it will receive attorneys' fees if faced with unsuccessful intervenor attack.
In addition, the proposed formulation shores up the important
weaknesses of the NRDC rule: it eliminates the troublesome asymmetry by rewarding a successful party with fees and requiring an
unsuccessful party to pay them; it deemphasize's the problematic
public entity-private entity distinction; and it comports with settled notions of deferential treatment of settlement and the de facto
subordinate status of intervenors.
This alternative method of considering the intervenor-settlement fee problem, if applied to the NRDC situation, would yield
the opposite result from that reached by the NRDC court. The environmentalists completely prevailed in their defense of the consent decree and furthered statutory goals in doing so. Conversely,
the intervenors completely failed to modify or to convince the
court to vacate the decree, and the degree of their contribution to
statutory goals was virtually nonexistent. The fact that NRDC ultimately gained implementation of the decree would have made an
award of fees to it "appropriate."
CONCLUSION

This comment's solution to the post-settlement intervenor fee
award question is not meant to suggest that intervenors will always
be liable for fees. The rule allows intervenors who are even partially successful to escape fee liability. If the settlement attackers
in NRDC, for example, had succeeded in overturning the decree
altogether, an award of fees against them would not have been
"appropriate," but it might have been against the unsuccessful settlement defenders. If the intervenors had succeeded only in modifying the decree, then an award of fees to anyone may not have
120 See notes 115 and 116.
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been "appropriate," for it can be said of such a situation that both
sides prevailed to some extent yet it would not be clear which side
acted in a manner more directly serving the public interest. Such
situations
inevitably require
balancing and case-by-case
determination.
The difficulty in a fee award determination lies in reconciling
the rights of the original litigants with the right of intervenors to
protect their interests. Under this comment's solution, only those
intervenors who fail completely will bear the fee burden. Such a
view, to borrow the words of Justice Stevens, 12 ' best fulfills the
purpose of a fee award by ensuring that the costs of litigation are
allocated equitably.
Karen Williams Kammer

121 Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 706 (purpose of fee award is equitable allocation of litigation costs while encouraging achievement of statutory goals) (dissent of Stevens, J.), quoting
Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1338 (1st Cir. 1973).

